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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 The scars left by the Spanish Civil War and the ensuing 36 years of Franquist rule 
are still tangible in the culture of Spain today. In fact, almost 70 years after the 
conclusion of the conflict, the Civil War remains the most defining event in modern 
Spanish history. Within the confines of the three-year conflict, however, the internal 
“civil war” that raged amongst the various leftist groups played a very important role in 
the ultimate outcome of the war. The Spanish Civil War was not simply a battle between 
fascism and democracy or fascism and communism as it was often advertised to be. 
Soldiers and militiamen on both sides fought to defend many different ideologies. Those 
who fought for the Republican Army believed in anarchism, socialism, democracy, 
communism, and many other philosophies.  
 The Soviet Union and the Spanish Communist Party were very involved in both 
the political situation prior to the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War and in the war itself. 
This report will analyze the Communists’ role in the evolution of the Second Spanish 
Republic and in the outcome of the war. Section II will examine the political and social 
situations of Spain and Europe prior to the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. Such an 
examination will identify circumstances in Spain that created tensions between the 
government, the upper-class, and the working class and study the ever-increasing 
tensions that threatened Europe as a whole. An analysis of the history of Marxism and 
communism within Spain itself (Section III) will help to frame the involvement of the 
Communists in the Spanish Republic and the policies they pursued to either avoid or 
propel the start of the war. Section IV will discuss the intervention of foreign powers in 
the Spanish Civil War and the conditions that resulted in the outbreak of war. Finally, the 
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actions and policies of the Communists during the war will be analyzed in Section V to 
determine the effect they produced on the outcome of the war. This analysis will 
ascertain whether the Communist Party aided the Spanish Republic or in fact helped 
destroy it.  
 
II. EUROPE AND SPAIN PRIOR TO THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR 
 During the approximately thirty years between the end of the First World War and 
the start of the Second, Europe as a whole experienced many changes. These changes 
influenced developments within Spain prior to the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 
1936 and also influenced how the European nations responded to the Spanish conflict. 
 Other than World War I, the first major change that occurred in Europe was the 
Russian Revolution of 1917. During the Russian Revolution, worker uprisings overthrew 
the monarchist regime of Czar Nicholas II and replaced it with a Communist government 
based on Marxist principles that had been somewhat modified by Vladimir Lenin, the 
first leader of a Communist Russia. As a result of the destruction caused by World War I, 
many other European countries found themselves to be in social and economic conditions 
that paralleled those in Russia prior to the Russian Revolution. These social conditions 
permitted the rapid spread of communism throughout Europe, with Communist parties 
appearing in nearly all of the major European powers. The propagation of communism 
became a question of great concern for the European democracies, specifically France 
and Great Britain, who viewed communism as a threat to their traditional ways of 
government.  
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 In 1922, a Fascist regime took hold in Italy when Benito Mussolini assumed the 
role of dictator. Mussolini had been appointed Prime Minister by the Italian king Victor 
Emmanuel III, who saw the need for either a Fascist or Socialist government to avoid a 
Communist takeover within the country. It was through this appointment that Mussolini 
was able to obtain total political control over Italy. 
 The Great Depression also had a drastic effect on the situation within Europe. The 
Depression decimated the economies of Europe, which were still in a rebuilding phase 
from the First World War. One of the results of the economic crises that affected Europe 
was the appearance of a totalitarian government in Germany. The dissolution of the 
Weimar Republic’s Grand Coalition as a result of strong opposition in the wake of the 
Depression allowed Adolf Hitler, the leader of the Nazi Party, to establish a foothold in 
the German government. By August of 1934, Hitler had managed to consolidate control 
over both the military and the Nazi party, cementing him as the supreme ruler of 
Germany. Hitler modeled his regime after Mussolini’s, which valued totalitarianism, 
extreme nationalism, and militarism while opposing liberalism, especially Marxism and 
communism (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2007).  
 Essentially, European nations were facing a struggle between various forms of 
progressivism such as socialism, democracy, and communism, and conservative 
backlashes of fascism, resulting in two World Wars. These conflicts would ultimately 
envelop Spain, too, forcing a war between conservatism and liberalism; however, the 
plight of Spain begins much earlier. 
 Throughout the nineteenth century, Spain as a whole suffered from a great deal of 
social and economic underdevelopment. The country had experienced little 
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industrialization and consequently the Spanish populace did not boast a middle-class such 
as existed in Britain and France. This lack of development was partly a result of Spain’s 
isolation from the rest of Europe. Though it had some connections to France due to the 
reign of the Bourbon family, Spain’s geographic location and lack of involvement in 
European affairs kept it relatively isolated. This isolation permitted the persistence of one 
of the main sources for Spain’s lack of development: the country’s political situation. The 
Spanish government essentially consisted of an oligarchy. The monarchy served as the 
official head of state and was supported by the upper-class members of the Cortes (the 
Spanish version of Parliament), the military, and the Catholic Church.  Together, these 
groups stood as arbiters of conservative power, allowing the government to deeply 
entrench itself in the political structure. Without the presence of a large middle-class in 
the first half of the century to foment a bourgeois revolution such as had occurred in 
France, the oligarchy faced no true threat to its power. Consequently, the government saw 
no need for structural change within its administration despite the changes occurring 
within the country.  
 During the middle of the nineteenth century, Spain saw a sudden increase in the 
level of its industrial development. The arrival of the railroad and the development of 
industry along the northern and eastern coasts of Spain led to the emergence of both the 
working and middle-classes. The middle-class, inspired by the democratic ideas of the 
Enlightment and the bourgeois revolutions of France and the United States, recognized 
that the oligarchy stood as an obstacle to the development of Spain. For the first time, 
truly liberal groups had emerged in Spain. The social and economic progress that was 
beginning to surge within the country was constricted by the archaic conservative values 
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of the oligarchy. The very nature and structure of the government prohibited it from 
adapting to Spain’s evolution, however. Unrest within the government as indicated by 
rebellions within the Army demonstrated the government’s weakness to the moderates 
and liberals. It would be only a matter of time until they would act upon that fragility. 
 In 1868, the middle-class partnered with Army defectors to foster a bourgeois 
revolution, known as the Glorious Revolution, which led to the fall of Isabel II. As 
Gerald Brenan explains: 
The middle classes had risen because her camarilla governments had taken away their 
liberties, the generals had risen because she had chosen a lover who was not in the 
Guards, the people had risen because they had lost their common lands and because they 
disliked being sent to die in remote unhealthy climates in incomprehensible wars. (2) 
 
 Though the middle-class had achieved its goal of deposing the oligarchy, the members of 
the Cortes could not agree on what sort of government to implement. It was finally 
decided that a constitutional monarchy should be established in accordance with the 1869 
constitution, and in 1870 the Italian prince Amadeo was elected as King Amadeo I of 
Spain. He swore to abide by the Spanish Constitution but his government lasted only two 
years before he was forced to abdicate his throne. On February 11, 1873, liberals, 
republicans, and moderates in the Cortes voted by a majority to declare the First Spanish 
Republic. 
 As the founders of the first true liberal government of Spain, the leaders of the 
Republic were unsure how to proceed. It did not help that the Republic was plagued by 
many problems, including questions of regional autonomy, sedition in the army, a lack of 
political legitimacy, and fighting amongst the Republican leadership. The government’s 
inability to resolve its issues resulted in the restoration of the monarchy and the 
proclamation of Alfonso XII (Isabel II’s son) as king in 1874. Though the monarchy had 
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been restored, the political environment of the nation required it to follow (at least in 
appearance) a constitution, drafted by Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, a conservative 
politician who served as the administrator of Alfonso XII’s government. Recognizing the 
need to appease the growing Radical and Republican masses, Cánovas constructed the 
façade of a constitutional monarchy while reconstructing the oligarchy. In order to 
maintain the semblance of the constitutional monarchy, Cánovas implemented elections 
in which property owners were permitted to vote for representatives to the Cortes. For 
nearly 60 years, however, not a single election would be honest. 
Cánovas, as a politician, saw that Spain must be governed for a time by the upper classes, 
who alone could be counted on to support the new regime. But the country (that is to say 
those who had the right to vote) was mainly Radical with a strong admixture of 
Republicans, and under free elections they would have returned a Radical majority to the 
Cortes. This was the reason why the elections had at first, until the Monarchy should gain 
strength and prestige, to be controlled. (Brenan, 3-4) 
 
Every election or so, the control of the Cortes would systematically switch hands from 
Liberals to Conservatives. One of Cánovas’s tactics was to resign and let Liberals take 
over if an economic crisis occurred. Yet by the last quarter of the century, there really 
was little difference between the so-called “Liberal” and “Conservative” parties “except 
that Liberals were anti-clerical and interested themselves in education, whilst the 
Conservatives professed a mild concern for agriculture and for social conditions” 
(Brenan, 4-5). The false elections continued throughout the rest of the century and 
government handovers were orchestrated to facilitate the succession of Alfonso XII, who 
died before the birth of his son, Alfonso XIII. As a rule, the party that formed the 
elections generally won them, and so the farce continued into the twentieth century. 
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 Despite some development during the middle and latter parts of the nineteenth 
century, the effects of Spain’s lag in modernization and industrialization could be felt 
well into the 1900’s (Bennassar, 16).   
Poverty was so great…that over half a million Spaniards, out of a population of eighteen 
and a half million, emigrated to the New World in the first decade of the century alone. 
Life expectancy was around thirty-five years, the same as at the time of Ferdinand and 
Isabella. Illiteracy rates, varying sharply by area, averaged 64 per cent overall. Two thirds 
of Spain’s active population still worked on the land…Industry and mining provided only 
18 per cent of the jobs available… (Beevor, 9) 
The economic and social conditions of Spain at the start of the twentieth century isolated 
it from the political situation that was brewing throughout the rest of Europe at the time. 
While this isolation shielded Spain from the devastation of the impending World War, it 
also allowed the government and upper classes to continue to ignore the changes that 
were taking place within the country.  
 The political situation within Spain continued to destabilize as the twentieth 
century progressed. Beevor refers to the political atmosphere as a violent cycle between 
industrial revolt and repression (12). Several civilian uprisings and worker strikes took 
place during the first few decades of the twentieth century, such as Barcelona’s Semana 
Trágica (Tragic Week) in July 1909. The uprising began when supporters of the 
Republican Radical Party leader Alejandro Lerroux vandalized and burned churches. It 
ended when the army arrived to restore civil order and the final result was a massacre. 
The staunchly conservative military held great influence over the government and 
therefore served to impede social and governmental reforms within the country. To 
further complicate the situation, the military was greatly overmanned, with some 160,000 
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men in total (Beevor, 14). The excessively large military was a source of great economic 
drain on the government. Anti-military sentiment was high throughout the country due to 
the military’s severe and incompetent responses to the various crises that Spain was 
experiencing.   
 Due to its relative isolation from other European countries, Spain chose to 
maintain a policy of neutrality during World War I. Its neutrality allowed it to serve as a 
source of agricultural products and raw material exports for both the Allied and Axis 
Forces, and consequently Spain’s economy began to boom. It was mainly industrialists 
that reaped the benefits of the economic growth, however. Industrial workers received a 
25 per cent increase in wages, but prices doubled (Beevor, 13). The end of the war 
brought with it the end of the period of economic prosperity. The pain of the war also led 
Spain’s European neighbors to revert to protectionist governments, pushing Spain back 
into its pre-war isolation. The glimmer of hope that had been visible during the few years 
of prosperity created resentment between the social classes that would only serve to 
create more problems in the years to come. 
  The general social conditions within Spain continued to deteriorate in the post-
World War I period. The infant mortality rate fell and the population grew, leading to an 
influx of migrants in the cities and a jump in the unemployment rate. The government, 
nevertheless, was not yet ready or willing to abandon the conservative attitudes that had 
prevailed since the nineteenth century. Though worker movements inspired by Marxism 
and Anarchism had recruited large numbers of members throughout the end of the 
nineteenth century and the start of the twentieth, it was not until the late 1920’s that these 
movements were powerful enough to have the potential to force substantive change 
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within the government. The government’s inability to keep pace with the evolving social 
environment only added fuel to the frustrations that already plagued the Spanish 
populace.  
 The inspiration of the Russian Revolution led workers to become more militant 
and strikes became more frequent during the 1920’s. Inspired by the success of the 
proletarian revolution in Russia, Spanish workers began to threaten landowners, telling 
them that they might face the same end as Russian landowners had at the hands of the 
revolutionaries (Beevor, 16). The governments began to recognize the need for urgent 
land reforms, but the rapid turnover of governments prevented any solution to the land 
problems. Any hope of progress was destroyed in 1921 when the Spanish Army suffered 
a great defeat at Annual in Morocco that was blamed on Alfonso XIII. The government 
began an inquiry into the incident, but the military general Miguel Primo de Rivera 
pronounced himself dictator during a coup d’etat in 1923 to avoid public reprimand 
against the King and the Army. After Primo de Rivera regained civil control within the 
country, he set forth a program to modernize the country’s infrastructure; however, the 
program was overambitious and the national deficit grew dramatically. Opposition to his 
dictatorship became rampant. By 1930, Primo de Rivera saw no other option than to 
present his resignation to the King.  
  Alfonso XIII called on General Dámaso Berenguer to fill the void left by Primo 
de Rivera’s resignation. The King’s choice greatly insulted the head of the Guardia Civil, 
General Sanjurjo, who would later become instrumental in planning an August 1932 coup 
that would anticipate the Civil War. As strikes became more rampant, Berenguer began 
to lose control of the political situation and was replaced on February 14, 1931 by 
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Admiral Juan Bautista Aznar. Alfonso XIII declared that municipal elections would be 
held on April 12. Socialist and liberal Republican candidates won the majority of the 
provincial capitals and Admiral Aznar presented the king with the resignation of his 
government. On April 14, 1931, Alfonso XIII fled Spain and the Second Republic of 
Spain was proclaimed by Republican leaders (Beevor, 19-20). The elected leaders formed 
a provisional government and began to push through a variety of liberal reforms, 
including (but not limited to) the reduction of the length of obligatory military service 
and the forced retirement of many officers, the separation of Church and State, and 
freedom of worship. These changes did nothing but further antagonize the military, the 
Church, and the conservative elements of the population. The government’s repression of 
worker strikes caused even the syndicates to favor revolution against the Republic. 
 Elections were held at the end of June 1931 and the government, headed by 
Manuel Azaña, continued even further with its progressive programs. Azaña had a vision 
of Spain that was very different from how the country had operated historically. “[Azaña] 
Tenía una buena formación jurídica […] y había pasado dos largas temporadas en Francia 
[…]. Admiraba las instituciones del país vecino y soñaba con transformer España según 
ese modelo de sociedad laica, gobernada por las leyes de la democracia burguesa” 
(Bennassar, 42). Over a two year period, conservative groups became increasingly 
disaffected and organized themselves under José María Gil Robles, the leader of the 
Spanish Confederation of the Autonomous Right (Confederación Española de Derechas 
Autónomas). During the 1933 elections, CEDA won the most seats in the Cortes and used 
its power to try to annul and repeal all the progressive reforms put through by Azaña. 
 13
 The conservative government’s policies resulted in a backlash from workers’ 
unions and strikes were declared throughout Spain. The most notable of all the strikes 
was the Asturian miners’ rebellion in October of 1934. 20,000 workers seized all the 
mining areas and began to overrun police posts to obtain weapons. On October 6, they 
invaded the Asturian capital of Oviedo where they declared a proletarian revolution. 
Revolutionary terror overtook the city, and many clergymen were killed by the workers. 
Columns of the Spanish Army and Air Force took back control of the city a week later. 
Fighting between the workers and the military continued until the workers surrendered on 
October 18. During the two weeks of the insurrection, casualties were enormous, with 
approximately 1,200 deaths (Payne, 55). The government responded quickly, arresting 
and executing thousands of workers. The conservative government’s harsh reaction to the 
Asturias rebellion greatly weakened its support base as the 1936 elections approached. 
Consequently, a coalition of the leftist parties, known as the Popular Front, was able to 
regain a majority in the Cortes. Just as their right-wing predecessors had done, the 
Popular Front government attempted to annul or repeal any legislation that had been put 
forth by the previous administration. The tension between conservatives and liberals 
during this period continued to boil, ultimately exploding into the Spanish Civil War.  
 
III. THE HISTORY OF COMMUNISM IN SPAIN 
 Though both Marxism and communism had existed in Spain for almost half a 
century prior to the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, they were not overwhelmingly 
popular movements among the Spanish populace. In 1879, the Partido Socialista Obrero 
Español (Spanish Socialist Worker Party, PSOE) was established and its union, the Unión 
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General de Trabajadores (General Union of Workers, UGT) was created in 1888. At the 
time of the party’s founding, however, Spain was still a chiefly agricultural nation, and 
the UGT only managed to recruit 100,000 members by the time of World War I. In 
contrast, anarchism grew to be an extremely popular movement among the Spanish, and 
the anarchist Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (National Confederation of Labor, 
CNT) contained over 700,000 members following World War I (Payne, 9). In both 
syndicates, the most active centers were located in Catalonia and the Basque Country, 
which were by far the most industrialized and developed regions of Spain. Consequently, 
they experienced an emergence of a conscious working class earlier than other provinces 
(Alba, 3).  
 Prior to 1920, many Spaniards saw similarities between the social and economic 
situations of Spain and those of pre-revolutionary Russia. As a result, the Russian 
Revolution found many sympathizers among the Socialists and Anarchists of Spain. In 
fact, at the second CNT congress of 1919, leaders stated that the goal of the CNT was the 
formation of a “libertarian communist” regime (Alba, 5). In 1920, the PCE, PSOE, and 
CNT considered joining the Third Communist International (Comintern), but soon 
afterwards, the socialists and anarchists rescinded their affiliation with the Comintern 
after rejecting Lenin’s Twenty-one Conditions1. Nonetheless, during April of 1920, the 
PSOE’s youth movement Federación de Juventud Socialista (Federation of Young 
Socialists, FJS) voted to break away from its parent organization to found a Communist 
                                                 
1 Lenin’s Twenty-one Conditions were a set of regulations for organizations that desired to affiliate 
themselves with the Third Communist International. The requirements were made to ensure that the new 
parties would experience a complete break from the Socialist and Social Democratic parties from which 
they originated. Some of the regulations included the inclusion of the word “Communist” in the party’s 
official name, periodic purges of their ranks, the maintaining of an official party press, and a policy of 
constant “warfare” against Social Democratic parties. (Encyclopedia Britannica, 2007). 
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party affiliated with the Comintern. The FJS fused with pro-Soviet dissidents from the 
PSOE to form the Partido Comunista de España (Communist Party of Spain, PCE). As a 
result of differing opinions regarding the split from the Comintern, the Spanish Marxist 
and communist groups found themselves increasingly divided. Comintern officials were 
sent to Madrid in 1922 to attempt to reunify the various communist groups, but the effort 
met with great difficulty. It was not long before the extremism of the PCE began to 
concern the Soviet leadership. The PCE began to turn towards violence with increasing 
frequency and refused to cooperate with the Comintern’s policy of a United Front with 
the UGT and CNT, earning “a minor notoriety among the Bolshevik leaders for its 
dissensions and leftist tendencies” (Payne, 15). Consequently, the PCE began to see its 
influence and power within the Comintern decline.  
 Some of the most influential members of the CNT, most notably Andreu Nin and 
Joaquín Maurín, also were attracted by the romanticism of the Russian Revolution when 
they visited Russia with the first CNT delegations to the Comintern in 1920. Though their 
personalities were quite different, they “had in common their conception of politics as the 
education of the populace, their sympathy for the Bolshevik revolution, and an 
impassioned interest in the Marxism they had just begun to study” (Alba, 7). They both 
believed that it was important for the CNT to be involved with the Comintern and its 
labor syndicate arm, the Profintern. After the CNT incorporated itself with the 
Comintern, Nin remained in the Soviet Union to work as a delegate of the CNT. Despite 
Nin’s position, the purely anarchist elements of the CNT were unsympathetic to the 
Profintern because of the imprisonment of many Russian anarchists in March 1921. 
Maurín believed that it was necessary to combine the ideals of Marxism with the ideals of 
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anarchism and collective violence, but was imprisoned in February 1922. Due to his 
imprisonment, the anarchists were able to revoke their affiliation with the Profintern and 
Nin was left in Russia representing no one (Alba, 9). Maurín’s position was quashed by 
the CNT leadership, and he set about organizing new groups that would maintain 
association with the Comintern and Profintern. Both Maurín and Nin met several times 
with Leon Trotsky and were extremely impressed and influenced by his revolutionary 
ideas. Nonetheless, their association with Trotsky would plague them throughout their 
involvement in the Spanish conflict.  
 In 1923, General Primo de Rivera assumed control of the government through a 
military coup. His opposition to communism and the worker’s revolution led to the 
repression of both the PCE and CNT. Though they were not officially outlawed, the 
parties were tightly regulated and they continued to work in secret to recruit more 
members and publicize their agendas (Elorza and Bizcarrondo, 43). Despite their 
common obstacles, the Communist groups became further divided. The PCE split into 
three new factions and Maurín and Nin’s relationship with Trotsky became increasingly 
suspicious and dangerous in the eyes of the Comintern and its affiliates in Spain. Maurín 
was expelled by the PCE in June of 1931 for following “a liberal Menshevik line which, 
in the current situation of Spain, constitutes a true betrayal of the proletariat revolution” 
(Elorza, 77). After his expulsion from the party, Maurín created the Bloc Obrer i 
Camperol (Worker-Peasant Bloc, BOC) in Barcelona. Andreu Nin, who had been 
expelled from the PCE in 1928, created the Izquierda Comunista de España (Communist 
Left of Spain, ICE) in March 1932, an officially Trotskyist party. Other dissidents in 
Catalonia formed their own party, the Partit Comunista de Catalunya (Communist Party 
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of Catalonia, PCC). Though many of these dissident groups had very few members, their 
inability to agree and cooperate set the stage for the lack of unity that would later plague 
the Republic during the war. As the Communist groups in Spain continued to fracture, 
Dmitry Manuilsky, a member of the Executive Committee of the Communist 
International stated that, “in Spain you have an excellent proletariat, such as perhaps we 
lacked in Russia…but not a communist party. That is the tragedy” (Payne, 20).  
 Stalin’s consolidation of power within the Soviet Union in 1933 complicated the 
situation in Spain even further. For several years, Spain was put on the back burner by the 
Stalinist USSR, who believed it to be one of the lower priorities in Europe. With the lack 
of direction from the Comintern, the influence and unity of the PCE deteriorated within 
Spain. It was not until 1930, during the right-wing dictatorship of Dámaso Berenguer that 
the Soviets decided to get involved again in Spain. They attempted to resurrect the PCE 
in order to spur a revolutionary movement, but by this time, the PCE was so incredibly 
fractured that such attempts failed. To make matters worse, the PCE was in disagreement 
with the Comintern’s policies regarding the Spanish situation. General Sanjurjo’s 
attempted military coup in 1932 led to the PCE coming to the defense of the Spanish 
Republic. The Comintern saw these actions as counterrevolutionary; they proclaimed that 
the Republic was a façade for what would soon become a fascist dictatorship. José 
Bullejos, who had served as secretary-general of the PCE for nearly eight years, was 
denounced by the Italo-Argentinian Vittorio Codovilla, the adviser to the PCE’s Madrid 
leadership, as a counterrevolutionary. Bullejos and two other top PCE officials were 
forced to resign for their refusal to aid in the overthrow of the Spanish Republic. The 
replacements for the PCE’s leadership were required to maintain absolute obedience to 
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the Comintern and high enthusiasm for the fulfillment of Comintern policies. 
Consequently, the new leadership of the PCE was more or less a group of Comintern 
puppets. The new leaders included José Díaz, who had served as the PCE’s head in 
Andalucía, Jesús Hernández, one of Spain’s first graduates of the Lenin School in 
Moscow, Vicente Uribe, and Dolores Ibárruri, known most commonly as “La 
Pasionaria”. As Elorza and Bizcarrondo explain, though they were named as the new 
PCE leadership, these four were not truly in charge. 
...no cabe hablar en rigor de historia del Partido Comunista de España, sino de historia de 
la Sección española de la Internacional Comunista. Las decisiones que luego ejecutaban 
los distintos órganos del PCE no eran fruto de una discusión colectiva en el Buró Político 
o en el Comité Central del Partido, ni emanban del buen sentido revolucionario de José 
Díaz o Dolores Ibárruri. (444) 
 
Rather, the “head” of the PCE between mid-1932 and mid-1937 was Codovilla, who 
Elorza and Bizcarrondo describe as “la cabeza visible y actuante...un comunista 
argentino, maniobrero y astuto” (444). Though native Spaniards were designated as the 
leaders of the PCE, the decisions and policies implemented by the PCE were often not 
decided upon by Spaniards concerned only with the best outcome for their country and 
their people.  
 A further point of contention amongst the Communists was the Soviet Union’s 
complete ignorance of the situation in Spain. The Comintern considered Spain to still be 
a semi-feudal country despite the protests of the PCE and other groups that such was not 
the case. It became the agenda of the dissident Communist parties to create a form of 
Marxism adapted to the circumstances of Spain. Maurín observed the bourgeois-
democratic revolution to be weak within the country. The powerlessness of the 
bourgeoisie and the divisions amongst the working class population made the idea of a 
bourgeois-democratic revolution implausible for Spain. Instead, according to Maurín, the 
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only route for a successful Spanish revolution was the arming of the working class. The 
armed proletariat would forge a sense of unity and purpose and propel the outbreak of the 
bourgeois revolution. 
The basic FCC-B/BOC2 program therefore set forth such revolutionary goals as giving 
land to all those who worked it, recognizing self-determination for national minorities, 
arming a worker militia, controlling industrial production by the syndicates, and 
nationalizing banking, mines, and transport. This program was to be carried out in 
conjunction with the consolidation of the bourgeois-democratic revolution; and only after 
that revolution had been completed would it be possible to talk of establishing a worker-
peasant republic, which could move on to the socialist revolution. (Payne, 39) 
 
Though Maurín was in disagreement with the PCE about how to bring about the ultimate 
goal of a workers’ revolution, he did agree with their stance which labeled social 
democrats as the worker revolution’s greatest foe.  
 Provincial autonomy became an increasingly divisive issue amongst all Spanish 
political groups, both those on the left-wing and those on the right. The PCE sought 
autonomy for all regions of the Iberian Peninsula, followed by their unification under an 
Iberian Union of Socialist Republics, much like the model Lenin had established for 
Russia. The BOC believed that only those regions with “historic nationality”, namely 
Catalonia and the Basque Country, should be granted autonomy. In contrast, the FAI-
CNT threatened to take up arms against any attempts to separate Catalonia from the 
Spanish nation. Maurín had initially believed the CNT to be a key ally for the BOC party; 
however, the increasing discord over the issue of Catalan autonomy lead to altercations 
between the two groups throughout 1932 and part of 1933 and damaged the cooperative 
relationship Maurín had envisioned. 
                                                 
2 The FCC-B (Federación Comunista Catalano-Balear, or Catalan-Balearic Communist Federation) was 
formed by the fusion of CSR parties (Comités Sindicalistas Revolucionarios or Revolutionary Syndicalist 
Committees) in order to allow them to enlist in the PCE. The FCC-B later joined with Maurín’s BOC to 
promote revolutionary activity after his dismissal from the PCE.  
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 In order to encourage membership growth within the PCE, the leadership set out 
to develop PCE sections within the various provinces of Spain. Additionally, they 
promised autonomy to Catalonia and the Basque Country and to any other separatist 
regions in exchange for solidarity with the PCE and the pursuit of a worker-peasant 
government established by a proletarian revolution. The official Communist line at this 
time decried social democracy as the true evil, and in Spain the enemy was the PSOE. 
Though Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor of Germany at the end of January 1933 did 
not yet greatly concern the leadership of the USSR, the result shook the Communist 
groups in many other countries, including Spain. The PSOE began to encourage 
cooperation with the PCE and other workers’ groups in order to fight the impending 
danger of fascism in Spain. The fear of fascism in Spain became so overblown that nearly 
everyone was accusing his enemies and opponents of being fascist. According to the 
Anarchists, Communists, Republicans, and Socialists were fascist. The Communists, for 
their part, referred to the Republican government as a fascist regime (Payne, 36). The 
lack of trust among leftist groups would serve as a major obstacle to the development of a 
unified party that could stand up to the fascist or nationalist threat that would soon 
emerge. 
 After the government of Azaña fell in 1933, a second set of elections for the 
Republic was held. As a result of the lack of unity amongst all the leftist groups operating 
in Spain, only the PSOE managed to retain a large representation within the parliament. 
The right, on the other hand, won a decisive victory. The PCE found itself increasingly 
isolated from the other leftist groups, but nonetheless the official party line continued to 
portray the socialists and anarchists as agents of fascism. A headline of Mundo obrero on 
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January 13, 1933 read: “Like ravens and hyenas. The socialist leaders roll around in the 
worker blood spilled by themselves” (Elorza, 173). In contrast, many of the rank-and-file 
of the PCE disagreed with the PCE leadership and felt that it was necessary to ally with 
other leftist groups in order to fight back against the conservatives’ victory in the 
elections and to ignite the Spanish revolution. Members of the PCE began to question the 
official party line and some even left the party altogether to answer Maurín’s call for a 
front against the right and against fascism. In November of 1933, an Alianza Obrera 
contra el Fascismo (Worker Alliance against Fascism) was formed in Barcelona, 
consisting of representation from the Catalan arms of the BOC, the PSOE, the UGT, the 
ICE, and several other groups. The Alianza proclaimed its goal to be the defeat of 
fascism and the advance of the socialist revolution.  
 Threatened by the right’s victories in the 1933 elections, the PSOE and 
moderately left political groups became increasingly radical. Francisco Largo Caballero, 
the Republic’s Minister of Labor, claimed that the country was in a “full-scale civil war” 
against the right (Payne, 45). Both moderate and more extremist left-wing groups began 
attempting to bring down the elected government and called for the cancellation of the 
election results. Despite the prior differences between the Socialists and the Communists, 
Largo Caballero announced that “the difference between [the Communists] and us is no 
more than words” (Payne, 46) and the PSOE leadership began to justify the use of 
violence for political means. After 1933, Largo Caballero was given the nickname of the 
“Spanish Lenin”, a name indicative of the increasingly bolshevized Socialist line within 
the PSOE (Elorza, 80). 
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 Despite the leftward shift in the Socialists’ stance, it was not until September 
1934 that the PCE ceased referring to the PSOE as social fascists and instead decided to 
join the Alianza Obrera in Madrid. Late 1934 also marked an overall shift in the 
Comintern’s policies within Europe. Feeling increasingly threatened by Hitler, Stalin 
began to form diplomatic relations with other European nations in an attempt to reduce 
Soviet isolation and provide greater security for his country. The new Communist policy 
called for the formation of a broad coalition against fascism involving Communists, 
Socialists, and moderate democratic and leftist groups. The goal of the Communist party 
was still a socialist revolution and the installation of a worker’s government, but fascism 
was the more pressing issue. The Communists knew that a fascist government coming to 
power would virtually end all hopes of the proletarian dictatorship. As a result, the 
Popular Front was viewed as a necessary intermediate step in order to protect the 
possibility of reaching the final goal.  
 In July of 1935, Joaquín Maurín and Andreu Nin combined their BOC and ICE 
parties to form the Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista (Worker Party of Marxist 
Unification, POUM). Maurín’s recipe for the success of the socialist revolution was quite 
similar to that of the PCE, but his opinion on what exactly constituted fascism drove a 
wedge between the two communist groups. In fact, as Stanley Payne describes, “Maurín 
fue la figura más original y creativa de la izquierda revolucionaria en España, y lo más 
cercano a un teórico original español del marxismo” (qtd. in Zavala, 15). Nonetheless, 
during 1935, strict adherence to Marxism was not the philosophy being handed down 
from the Comintern to the Communist parties throughout Europe and the rest of the 
world. Maurín claimed that fascism was nothing more than the final stage of capitalism 
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and criticized the idea of the Popular Front, labeling it as a postponement of the socialist 
revolution. The new party was of instant concern to the PCE, who labeled it as a 
Trotskyist group due to Maurín and Nin’s previous affiliations with Trotsky. Indeed, 
Nin’s ICE contingent had initially been a Trotskyist group, but Nin had begun to separate 
himself from Trotsky’s ideals in 1932. By 1934, Nin had formally broken relations with 
Trotsky and Trotsky himself had denounced the POUM as a centrist organization for not 
adhering to his tactic of “entryism” (Nin, qtd. in Zavala, 57).3 The POUM officially 
rejected Trotskyism, but was nonetheless friendly to him, igniting a great deal of scrutiny 
from the Stalinist Communist parties.  
 In the 1936 elections, the Republicans and Communists were largely 
overrepresented among the leftist groups with the Socialists and the POUM only 
receiving a few candidacies. The Socialists accepted this format readily, but the POUM 
did so with reluctance. The POUM was against the entire concept of the Popular Front, 
but felt forced to cooperate in order to avoid total isolation. Of all leftist groups, the 
POUM was the only one that ran on a platform of immediate revolution to replace the 
Popular Front government with a worker government. The Popular Front government 
won the elections by a slim margin, but the far left saw the results as a go-ahead from the 
populace to implement their plans of revolution.  
 Despite the apparent unification of the Spanish left under the umbrella of the 
Popular Front, it became clear shortly after the 1936 elections that the unity was no more 
than a farce. The Socialists and Communists had simply latched on to the moderate left 
                                                 
3 Trotsky’s idea of entryism required dissident communists to incorporate themselves into the Second 
Socialist International parties and convert them to revolutionism. Nin did not believe that the ICE (the party 
he originally founded) had the manpower and influence to undertake such a campaign, and furthermore 
believed that it could not be successful in Spain at the time (Payne, 99). 
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Republicans as a way to gain the votes of the middle classes in the elections. As Diego 
Martínez Barrio, a Republican leader explained:  
‘certain Socialists, and all the Communists suffered from the mirage of what had taken 
place during the Russian revolution of 1917, and handed to us Republicans the sad role of 
Kerensky. According to them, our mission was reduced to smoothing their road to power, 
since the phase of the democratic revolution had already ended in the history of Spain.’ 
(Payne, 85)4  
 
In other words, the Republicans had essentially driven themselves into becoming 
obsolete. By aligning themselves solely with the revolutionary left, they made enemies of 
the right. Despite being told by the Socialists and Communists that they only desired the 
alliance as a means to earn an electoral victory, the Republicans chose to stick with the 
far left and consequently isolated themselves completely.  
 With the moderate left more or less out of the picture, the Socialists and 
Communists were free to begin implementation of their plans to achieve a worker’s 
government. Their agendas were aided by the obviously pro-radical Azaña government, 
which released revolutionary criminals from prison and threw military and police leaders 
who were loyal to the Republic into jail (Payne, 86). The government’s goal was not 
simply to annul the measures put into place by the Gil Robles’s conservative government, 
but rather to completely reverse those measures. Furthermore, the government did not 
attempt to stop or control the decline of public order that was often precipitated by left-
wing groups. Payne provides a small portion of what occurred, including “arbitrary 
arrests of rightists and centrists while the left usually enjoyed impunity; falsification of 
electoral results and processes; widespread confiscation of property, […]; and a mounting 
                                                 
4 Alexander Kerensky was one of the leaders of the February Revolution (1917) in Russia and a prominent 
leader of the first Soviet governments. He pursued a policy of “no enemies to the left” and completely 
isolated the conservative groups while greatly empowering the Bolsheviks. However, after the October 
Revolution of 1917, Lenin overthrew Kerensky’s government and Kerensky was forced to flee into exile. 
(Encyclopedia Britannica, 2007) 
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spiral of political violence” (86). The revolutionary parties already believed that they had 
received a mandate from the Spanish people to proceed; the actions of Azaña’s 
government served essentially as another green light for the Socialists and Communists to 
continue planning for the revolution of the masses. 
 The PCE put forth its path for developing the revolution in the February 25 issue 
of their newspaper, Mundo obrero. The plan called for: 
• Confiscation of all lands not held by peasants, which the latter may work 
individually or collectively. 
• Cancellation of all peasant debt, increase in wages, and reduction of the workday. 
• Nationalization of enterprises, banks, and railroads. 
• Liberation of oppressed people: Catalonia, Vizcaya, Galicia, and Morocco. 
• Suppression of the Civil Guard and Assault Guard. 
• Arming of the people. 
• Suppression of the regular army and liquidation of officers; democratic election of 
commanders by soldiers. 
• Fraternal alliance with the Soviet Union. 
      (Payne, 87-88) 
 
Through their press, Codovilla and Díaz made it clear that cooperation with the 
Republicans would only go so far as to ensure the implementation of the Popular Front’s 
program (the reversal of all the conservative government’s policies). Once the Popular 
Front’s program was completed, the Communists would then move towards rapid 
execution of their plan to eliminate the right and overthrow the Republican government. 
The Communists attempted to reach out and form an alliance with the Socialists to 
complete these goals, but neither the more moderate Socialists lead by Indalecio Prieto, 
nor the Bolshevized sector led by Largo Caballero accepted the Communists’ offer of 
cooperation. As a result, although the Communists were pleased to see that a large sector 
of the Socialists was increasingly revolutionary, they were nonetheless wary of the 
Socialists’ decision to maintain party separation.  
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 Conditions in Spain seemed to be proceeding according to the PCE’s plan; 
Azaña’s government was continuing to implement the Popular Front government, and the 
PCE saw that the time to overthrow the Republican government was rapidly approaching. 
In fact, on March 4, 1936, Codovilla sent a letter to the Comintern officials indicating 
that the Azaña government had even moved beyond the Popular Front program and that 
soon revolutionary conditions would be at their peak (Payne, 93). As the PCE prepared 
for the revolution, the Soviet leaders were becoming increasingly concerned about 
Hitler’s violation of the Treaty of Versailles by reoccupation of the Rhineland. Feeling 
the need for collective security more so now than ever before, Soviet leaders warned the 
PCE against any actions that would potentially upset the Azaña government. The Soviet 
leaders worried that if the Spanish situation continued to progress, then any hopes of 
forming an alliance with Britain and France would be lost. In a complete policy reversal 
that shocked the PCE leadership, the Comintern stated that effective immediately, the 
Party’s goal should be only to create a government that would prevent fascism and the 
counterrevolution from coming to power. The Comintern wrote: 
Do not allow yourselves to be provoked and do not precipitate events that at the present 
time might be harmful for the revolution and only assist in the triumph of the 
counterrevolution…In all the party’s activity it must be kept in mind that in the present 
situation the creation of soviet power is not the order of the day, but that, for the time 
being, the aim is only to create the kind of democratic regime that shuts the door to 
fascism and to counterrevolution... (Payne, 94) 
 
A successful defense of that goal would strengthen the position of the proletariat and its 
allies (Elorza, 283). The Soviet Union knew that Britain and France were concerned over 
the rise of communism throughout Europe. Any sort of Communist-led tumult in Spain 
would greatly damage the Soviet Union’s hopes of aligning itself with Britain and France 
against Hitler.  
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 As a result, the PCE’s rhetoric and tactics changed almost overnight. By mid-
April, the PCE leadership was calling for the Spanish people to support the Popular Front 
government and denounced labor strikes throughout the country. Virtually all of the 
PCE’s February plan was scrapped; the PCE said that the length of the workweek was 
acceptable and supported the structure of Spain as a series of semi-autonomous provinces 
under one national government as opposed to a free union of autonomous republics. The 
PCE, on the surface, at least, went from one of the government’s main enemies to one of 
its strongest supporters within just months.   
 With the sudden moderation in PCE politics, the POUM remained the only group 
that unwaveringly sought the realization of the socialist revolution. The POUM 
proclaimed themselves to be the only true communist party in Spain and called for Azaña 
to give his power to a more radical government that would help prepare for the 
proletarian dictatorship. The POUM’s line, which was in direct contradiction with that of 
the PCE, lead to a great amount of conflict between the two groups. The PCE began a 
campaign to destroy the POUM and all traces of Trotskyism within Spain, labeling them 
as fascist agents and persuading the more-radical Socialists to align against them. Despite 
Nin’s relationship with Trotsky and the officially Trotskyist position of the former ICE, 
the POUM itself was not a Trotskyist group. In fact, as noted earlier, Trotsky considered 
the POUM to be traitors to the cause of the socialist revolution due to Nin and Maurín’s 
refusal to adhere to Trotsky’s policy of entryism (Payne, 99). Nonetheless, that did not 
dissuade the PCE in the least from equating the POUM to Trotsky and to fascism. 
Because of the general public’s fear of fascism, the PCE would exploit this throughout 
the war in order to help turn public opinion away from the POUM. Later on, the 
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Communists would also employ this tactic as a means to have the POUM leadership 
removed from any and all governmental positions.  
 The situation in Spain in 1936 deteriorated rapidly. The Communists pressed the 
government to outlaw and disband any right-wing political groups and arrest the 
leadership of such parties, while still calling on the populace to support the Popular Front. 
Meanwhile, the constant infighting between the leftist parties and their varying stances on 
the Spanish Republic led to constant strikes and a general decline of public order. The 
government did little to try to contain the growing chaos. In fact, the government 
continued to cater to the far-left parties and their demands. On July 15, 1936 government 
police were sent to arrest José Calvo Sotelo, a monarchist leader, and a Socialist party 
member who accompanied the police shot and killed Sotelo. Sotelo’s assassination was a 
reprisal for the July 12 killing of the Socialist Assault Guard Lieutenant José Castillo 
Sería. The assassination of Sotelo was the final nail in the coffin for the Spanish 
Republic. On July 18, the military announced an insurrection and the Spanish Civil War 
had begun.   
 
IV. OUTBREAK OF THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR AND INTERVENTION OF 
FOREIGN POWERS 
 The Spanish Civil War began at 5 AM on July 18, 1936 with the revolt of the 
Army of Africa in Morocco. Once Morocco was secured, the military coup was to 
continue throughout the rest of mainland Spain. Though it had heard rumors of the 
insurrection, the Republican government was slow to react. Prime Minister Casares 
Quiroga believed that the majority of the generals would remain loyal to the Republic. 
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Consequently, he ordered municipal governments throughout the country not to provide 
arms to the UGT, CNT, and other syndicates. The government’s denial allowed the coup 
to proceed through much of Spain virtually uncontested. Though the military was not 
successful in its goal to take all of Spain within 48 hours, during that time frame the 
division of Spain into Nationalist and Republican zones became clear (Beevor, 55). 
 Casares Quiroga resigned his post as Prime Minister on the morning of July 19. 
The subsequent government formed by Azaña lasted just a few hours; its Prime Minister, 
Diego Martínez Barrio, attempted to negotiate with the military. The offer of peace was 
rejected and the workers were furious with what they perceived as the government’s 
attempts at treachery (Beevor, 62). A third government, headed by José Giral, finally 
came to terms with the fact that the military had revolted and that the country was at war. 
 By July 22, the war was not going as planned for the Nationalists and 
reinforcements were needed from Morocco. Unexpectedly, the Spanish Navy had chosen 
to remain loyal to the Republic and so aircraft were needed to transport the troops to the 
mainland. General Francisco Franco sent a message to Germany notifying them of “the 
new nationalist Spanish government” and requesting the use of “ten troop-transport 
planes with maximum seating capacity through private German firms” (Beevor, 64). This 
was not the only foreign aid that the Nationalists received throughout the course of the 
war. “Hitler and Mussolini were to provide military, naval, air, logistical and technical 
support, while American and British business interests supplied vital credits and oil” 
(Beevor, 79). 
  The Republic, in contrast, was not so fortunate. Journalists came from all over 
Europe to report on the Spanish war; the atrocities committed by each side were splashed 
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on headlines across the globe. The stories written by the journalists severely harmed the 
Republic’s hope for foreign aid and intervention.  
The violent excesses recounted in many papers justified that distaste for the 
revolution in the republican zone which ran strongly in British conservative and 
diplomatic circles. The left-wing administration in France under Léon Blum 
suppressed its natural sympathies and, alarmed by Hitler’s occupation of the 
Rhineland that spring, felt obliged to follow the British idea of refusing aid to 
both sides (a policy which was bound to favour the nationalists). (Beevor, 81) 
 
Once it became clear that the Spanish conflict would evolve into a long, drawn-out war, 
the Republic began to look for help from abroad for arms and supplies. Seeking aid from 
the United States government was not an option due to the U.S. Neutrality Act of 1935 
(this official government stance, however, did not prevent private businesses from 
providing trucks, credit, and oil to the nationalists). France was initially inclined to help, 
but was warned by Britain that such action would only further encourage Hitler to 
increase his aid to the nationalists. As a result, France proposed a policy of non-
intervention to Britain, the USSR, Germany, and Italy on August 2, 1936. While the pact 
was “agreed to” by all parties, it did not deter Germany and Italy from continuing to 
provide military and financial aid to Franco. In fact, as Magro and Gil describe, the pact 
was not even truly a pact at all. “En realidad nunca hubo un Acuerdo de No Intervención 
como tal, sino simples declaraciones, hasta 27, de los distintos gobiernos europeos, que 
jamás culminaron en un tratado único, con lo cual tampoco las violaciones de estas 
declaraciones fueron una violación del Derecho internacional” (134). Britain and France 
chose to turn a blind eye to the blatant German and Italian violations of the non-
intervention pact and cut off any and all commerce with the Republican government 
(Beevor, 137).  
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 Britain and France’s rationale for not aiding the Republic was fairly simple: they 
felt that doing so would be seen as a provocation by Hitler. Still recovering from the scars 
of the First World War, Britain sought to avoid another conflict at all costs and persuaded 
Leon Blum’s government to act against their sympathies and refrain from aiding the 
Republic. Ironically, the more traditional segments of the German government were wary 
of becoming involved with the Nationalists for fear of provoking Great Britain. Hitler 
chose to ignore the dissidents and pursued his own policy with regards to Spain. As 
Beevor explains, both Germany and Italy chose to aid Franco’s troops for strategic 
reasons. In the first place, the Spanish conflict provided a distraction for the rest of 
Europe from Hitler’s military buildup within Germany. Secondly, a Fascist Spain would 
serve as a proximate threat to France and as a threat to Britain’s control over the Suez 
Canal. Mussolini, too, was eager to see the establishment of another Mediterranean 
Fascist power. With a Fascist Spain as an indebted ally, Italy would have naval control 
over the entire Mediterranean Sea (Beevor, 137). 
 As a result of the PCE’s increasing importance within both the government and 
the populace of Spain, the USSR had been involved in the country’s affairs since before 
the outbreak of the Civil War. Consequently, the USSR was the only true foreign power 
to which the Republic could turn. The Soviet Union was hesitant to respond to Giral’s 
request due to Hitler’s involvement with the nationalists. Stalin feared that violating the 
non-intervention pact would harm the USSR’s diplomacy with Britain and France at a 
time when their friendship was most needed. Nonetheless, he also knew that refusing to 
aid the Republic would severely harm Soviet credibility amongst European Communist 
groups, and in the end, reputation won out. As Maurice Thorez, in charge of supplying 
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the Comintern with information regarding the French Popular Front suggested, “…la 
intervención fascista anulaba los supuestos de la pasividad impuesta al mundo comunista 
(léase URSS) por la no intervención” (Elorza, 318). As a result, the USSR passed a nine-
point resolution in mid-September to officially aid the Spanish Republic. The seventh and 
eighth points described the method in which the Soviet Union would help the Republic.  
7. Proceder al reclutamiento entre los obreros de todos los países, de voluntarios con 
experiencia militar, con el fin de su envío a Espana.  
8. Organizar la ayuda técnica al pueblo espanol mediante el envío de obreros y de 
técnicos cualificados. (Elorza, 322) 
 
These provisions led to the formation of the famous International Brigades, groups of 
volunteer militiamen from all over the world who came to fight on behalf of the Spanish 
Republic. As a result, by late September the Soviet Union began organizing military aid 
and supplies to help the Spanish Republic.  
 
V. COMMUNIST PARTY INVOLVEMENT IN THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR 
 Both the Soviet Union and the PCE were very involved with the left throughout 
the course of the Civil War. Analysis of the PCE’s actions and policies will attempt to 
show that their involvement in the war damaged the Republic more than it helped. By 
virtue of the PCE’s policies, they divided both the government and the militias. The 
PCE’s divisive actions greatly hindered the Spanish Republic in its fight against Franco 
and the Nationalists.  
 One of the PCE’s biggest projects throughout the course of the war was the 
creation of a Popular Army (also referred to as the People’s Army), comprised of all the 
leftist militia groups. The Communists suggested that the consolidation and official 
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training and organization of all the militia groups under a unified leadership would 
provide the only means to victory against the Nationalists.  
A mass of armed people which does not have severe discipline, which has not been 
instructed or prepared militarily, which is not acquainted with the fundamentals of an 
attack against the enemy, in time decomposes, becomes demoralized, loses its 
combativeness and continues to represent a danger to the rearguard… (Jesús Hernández, 
qtd. in Cattell, 87) 
 
The PCE also fought for the creation of a single, unified proletarian party, or a United 
Front to stand up to the Nationalists’ threat. Nonetheless, in some ways, the People’s 
Army and the United Front mirrors the Communists’ actions within the Popular Front 
government coalition. Though they preached the importance of unity amongst all 
Republicans, it was really a method for the Communists to gain further control of the 
situation and implement their programs and policies. Due to both their disciplined 
military training and their bargaining position with the Republic, Communists were 
placed into all the leadership roles of the People’s Army. In other words, the Communists 
essentially had sole control over the Popular Army. The Communist monopoly on the 
leadership positions outraged many of the militia groups, especially the CNT. It is true 
that many Soviets had much more extensive military training than members of the CNT 
or the other militia groups, but they were not necessarily more familiar with Spain itself. 
By preventing any leadership positions to be held by members of the other militias, the 
Communists alienated those groups and essentially undermined their own proclaimed 
goal of Republican unity. Many syndicate members refused to fully submit to the 
Communist discipline and as a consequence, the unity that the Communists sought was 
never fully achieved. Though the Communists claimed that unity and cooperation among 
all leftist groups was necessary, as they did in the elections of 1936, they also made it 
clear that they were in control and that the United Front would be run in their fashion or 
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not at all. Other actions taken by the Communists throughout the war further demonstrate 
the idea that their call for unification was nothing more than a simple ruse. 
 Perhaps the greatest source of disagreement between the various groups aligned in 
defense of the Spanish Republic was the idea of revolution. Some groups saw the Spanish 
situation as an indicator for the need of an immediate workers’ revolution, while other 
groups desired to postpone or prevent any sort of uprising from occurring. The PCE 
leadership was one of the most outspoken antirevolutionary groups of the Spanish left. 
According to the Communists, triggering a socialist revolution during a period of such 
instability would all but guarantee a victory for the Nationalists. The PCE leadership 
stressed that a proletariat revolution could only be successful once victory was in the 
hands of the Republic. At that time, the Spanish situation would be reassessed and only 
then would consideration be given to the execution of the workers’ revolt. One of the 
popular Communist slogans of the period, “The war first and the revolution afterwards” 
(Orwell, 67), is a clear demonstration of the PCE’s policy. Of course, the Communists 
were also trying to protect the interests of the Soviet Union, as a Communist Revolution 
in Spain would harm Soviet relations with France and Britain. Conservatives in Britain 
and in France were concerned about the proliferation of communism throughout Europe, 
and a Communist-led revolution in Spain would likely damage Stalin’s policy of 
collective security against Hitler.  
 In contrast, the POUM and some rank-and-file communists were among the most 
vehement opponents of postponing the workers’ revolution. They saw capitalism and 
fascism as equals, and believed that defending the Spanish Republic not only ran contrary 
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to the philosophies of Marxism, but that it was also a death sentence for the anarchist or 
socialist revolution. 
Spanish communists were strongly influenced by their own images of the Russian 
revolution, which they saw as a mixture of romantic heroism and a ruthless rejection of 
sentimentality to achieve what they thought would be a better society. […] Anyone who 
wavered or questioned this was a weak petit bourgeois, if not a traitor to the international 
proletariat. (Beevor, 47) 
 
The question of the revolution became a point that truly undermined any semblance of 
unity amongst the Spanish left. The only other group that sought the implementation of 
an immediate revolution was the CNT, and consequently the anarchists found themselves 
sympathizing with the plight of the POUM. Furthermore, although the PSOE had been 
cooperating with the PCE since the conception of the Popular Front government, some 
Socialists, including Largo Caballero, the Spanish Prime Minister, refused to completely 
give up on the idea of a Spanish revolution. He agreed that it was necessary for a 
centralized government to unify the various Republican groups, but he would not 
completely reverse the far left’s revolutionary program that had been implemented at the 
start of the war (Cattell, 132). Though the Communists initially supported Caballero, this 
would soon change once they realized that he would not bow to their every whim and that 
he would not give up on the revolution. Many of the problems that further divided the 
leftist groups throughout the course of the war hinged upon that central issue of the 
revolution. As Beevor describes, that single issue created a civil war within the civil war 
(262). Throughout much of 1937, the PCE would focus its energy on eliminating the 
dissidents among the left, completely destroying any remaining sense of unity that the 
Republican groups once had. It was this rabid infighting, this civil war within the civil 
war, which grabbed the attention of the entire left, effectively allowing Franco much 
more freedom to advance through Republican territory. Referring to this rampant disunity 
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as its own civil war is no exaggeration: the leftist groups attacked and persecuted each 
other both in word and in deed. Yet, in many instances, it is clear that the PCE was the 
primary instigator of the violence and quarrels.  
 On September 29, 1936, the Soviet Union officially approved a plan for military 
intervention in the Civil War. As previously mentioned, the Soviet Union was the only 
power that came to the defense of the Republic. The Soviets were able to provide 
weaponry, ammunition, and trained soldiers and officers to the Republic, which was 
sorely lacking both in arms and in trained military personnel. It is without question that 
the Republic was in dire need of the Soviet military aid in order to stand up against the 
well-trained and disciplined Spanish Army. Of course, the assistance was not simply a 
gift from the Soviets. Rather, it came at the price of greater Communist involvement 
within the Spanish government and within the People’s Army.  
La decisión soviética de intervenir militarmente en la guerra española demostró ser de 
crucial importancia, ya que permitió a la “Tercera” República revolucionaria, o la 
República en tiempo de guerra, sobrevivir al asalto de Franco a Madrid, y continuar la 
Guerra Civil durante algún tiempo más. Hubo que pagar un precio, y ése fue el inevitable 
crecimiento de la influencia soviética. (Payne, qtd. in Zavala, 16) 
 
Payne notes that one of the Soviet Union’s main approaches to the Spanish Civil War 
after September 1936 was “major internal participation and manipulation through the 
Comintern and the PCE” (146). This participation came both within the government and 
within the military. The Communists were able to gain such influence because they knew 
that the life of the Republic depended on their aid. Because the Soviet Union could 
threaten to withdraw its aid at any time, the PCE found itself in a position where its 
demands were paid greater attention. And, as will be shown, many of those demands 
benefited only the PCE. They used their increased influence to purge the dissident left 
from the Republican ranks and to overthrow the government of Largo Caballero. The 
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Communists became the dominant group among all the leftist parties and they made sure 
that their control was evident to everyone else. 
 The Communists were able to infiltrate the Republican government in a variety of 
ways. Firstly, they used propaganda and censorship to support the sympathies that many 
Spanish workers already held for the Russian Revolution (Cattell, 101). They also used 
propaganda to demean their opponents, most notably the POUM. The use of propaganda 
allowed for Communists, a group whose numbers had never been overwhelmingly large, 
to gain influence among the general Spanish populace. Within the government itself, 
Soviets and Spanish Communists served as “advisers” for many of the government 
personnel and often seemed to have nearly complete control over the operations of the 
People’s Army. Indalecio Prieto, serving as Minister of the Navy in 1936, complained of 
several instances in which the Communists altered and interfered with orders that were 
sent out from the government. As previously mentioned, most of the People’s Army 
leadership positions were held by Soviets or Spanish Communists, as well. The 
Communists also gained a great deal of influence over the government cabinet. Though 
they made an effort to maintain the façade of a Popular Front government by only having 
two of their party members in official cabinet positions (so as not to alarm Britain and 
France), the Communists found other ways to increase their sway over the cabinet 
ministers. One such method was by ensuring that members of other parties who were 
actually Communist followers or supporters were placed into the other cabinet posts. For 
example, Alvarez del Vayo, a Socialist, was supported by the PCE for the posts of 
Foreign Minister and General Commissar of the Army.  
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 In a set of schemes that run completely contrary to the idea of Republican 
unification, the Communists made use of personal vendettas and jealousies as a method 
to increase their influence. Jesús Hernández describes the Communists’ mind games with 
the Socialists as such: 
From their suicidal antagonisms we were able to benefit in advancing our cause. Today 
we supported this one in his fight against that one, tomorrow we would reverse the roles 
and support the latter, while today, tomorrow and always we pushed some against others 
to their mutual destruction, a game that we practiced openly with considerable success. 
(qtd. in Payne, 203) 
 
By taking advantage of the personal differences between Indalecio Prieto and Largo 
Caballero, the Communists were more or less able to gain control over the Socialist party. 
Knowing that the prietistas were not as set on revolution as Caballero was, the 
Communists worked to undermine Caballero’s support within the UGT and the PSOE. 
The more moderate Socialists approved of attacks against the Anarchists due to the 
Anarchists’ unwillingness to support the Republican government. Caballero refused to 
support or allow any sort of violence against the Anarchists, however, creating a tense 
situation within the PSOE and causing him to fall out of his party’s favor. Nonetheless, 
the Communists did not yet have a decisive event that would allow them to push 
Caballero out of power. They would have to wait until May 1937 (discussed further 
below) for such an opportunity to present itself. The Communists were also able to use 
the Socialists’ and Republicans’ disdain for the Anarchists to reduce the anarchists’ 
power within the government (Cattell, 111). The Socialists and Republicans had disliked 
and feared the Anarchists for quite some time. They worried that the Anarchists’ large 
following would provide the CNT with the power and the means to instigate an Anarchist 
revolution following the conclusion of the Civil War. Communist propaganda and the 
Socialist press painted the Anarchists as “uncontrollables” (Cattell, 135) and further fed 
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the anxieties of the more moderate leftist groups. The CNT’s sympathy for the POUM 
and their revolutionary stance only added fuel to the Communists’ fervent desire to have 
any traces of Anarchism removed from the cabinet. It would also take the events of May 
and the fall of Largo Caballero for the Communists to get their way, but eventually the 
government cabinet would have no Anarchists among its seats. As the Communists 
continued to employ various methods to discredit their opposition, they were also able to 
increase their power within the so-called Popular Front government and were able to 
move forward with their agendas as they pleased. 
 One of the PCE’s most ardent desires since even before the war began had been 
the complete elimination of the POUM. Throughout the first part of the Spanish Civil 
War, the POUM had become the PCE’s scapegoat for all problems that had occurred 
during the administration of the Second Republic. “Trotskyism was anathema to the 
Communists in the ‘thirties, and even though the POUM was not a Trotskyite party the 
Communists considered it as such and seized upon it for their revenge in Spain” (Cattell, 
118).5 Though they remained friendly to the Soviet exile, both the POUM leaders and 
Trotsky himself proclaimed that the POUM was not a Trotskyist party. Nonetheless, this 
did not discourage the Soviet Union and the PCE from attacking them as such. Despite 
Trotsky’s denunciation of the POUM, in appearance, at least, they became increasingly 
tied with Trotsky after Maurín was arrested in the Nationalist zone at the beginning of the 
                                                 
5 Trotskyism had become a thorn in the side of Stalinist Communists due to the difference in opinion of 
these two leaders regarding the way in which Communist revolutions should be carried out. Trotsky 
championed the idea of a permanent revolution, which would take place throughout the world. He also 
believed that the Soviet Union should be very hands-on and involved in the fostering of these revolutions. 
Stalin, on the other hand, was content to focus the majority his efforts on Russia. According to Trotsky, 
“Stalin’s mere ‘sympathy’ for the work of fomenting the ‘World Revolution of the World Proletariat’ is not 
enough…He accuses the Dictator of resting content, with the ‘partial revolution’ (i.e. the Sovietization of 
Russia). Comrade Trotsky, grand-old, fire-eating, impotent revolutionist, demands “The Permanent 
Revolution!” (TIME, Monday, July 14, 1930). 
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war. Following his arrest, the leadership of the POUM fell directly onto the shoulders of 
Andreu Nin, whose previously close friendship with Trotsky all but doomed the party.  
Andreu Nin…fue un hombre de gran inteligencia y capacidad, pero políticamente menos 
astuto, imaginativo y flexible. Desde el principio, los líderes del POUM habían hecho 
hincapié en que el suyo era el verdadero partido comunista español, en el sentido de 
formar un partido español genuino, no controlado desde Moscú, y en eso, por supuesto, 
tenían razón. Pero sin Maurín, atrapado desde el principio en la zona nacional, la 
dirección del POUM recayó en Andreu Nin, quien lideró el partido a través de una 
política extremista de revolución a ultranza, una política que no era la más práctica en 
medio de una guerra civil desesperada. Incluso la CNT demostró ser más flexible que el 
POUM. (Payne, qtd. in Zavala, 16) 
 
Nin’s inability to adapt the policies of his party to the political environment in Spain and 
his strict adherence to the idea of revolution mirrored Trotsky’s philosophies of a 
permanent, world-wide revolution. This allowed the PCE to further their portrayals of the 
party as a Trotskyist organization (and as previously mentioned, as an underground 
fascist organization).  
 The propaganda against the POUM became increasingly negative and critical and 
the Partido Socialista Unificat de Cataluña (Socialist Unification Party of Catalonia, 
PSUC) quickly became the POUM’s most outspoken enemy. The PSUC had been formed 
on July 25, 1936 from the fusion of several Catalonian Marxist groups. Though it 
employed the use of the world “Socialist” party within its title, the PSUC was effectively 
the PCE’s Catalonian equivalent. “It is necessary to explain that when one speaks of the 
P.S.U.C. ‘line’ one really means the Communist Party ‘line’” (Orwell, 58). The POUM 
was a group of very few members and hardly any influence outside of Catalonia, but it 
became the target of much persecution from the PSUC. As George Orwell explained in 
his memoir of the Spanish Civil War: 
The POUM was declared to be no more than a gang of disguised Fascists, in the pay of 
Franco and Hitler, who were pressing a pseudo-revolutionary policy as a way of aiding 
the Fascist cause. The P.O.U.M. was a ‘Trotskyist’ organization and ‘Franco’s Fifth 
Column’. […] And this story was spread all over Spain by means of posters, etc., and 
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repeated over and over in the Communist and pro-Communist press of the whole world. 
(Orwell, 64) 
 
Communist agents claimed to have recovered evidence that proved cooperation between 
the POUM and the Falange (the true Spanish Fascist party) and blamed the POUM for all 
the violent disturbances that had occurred in Barcelona over the previous several months 
(Beevor, 269). Though the “evidence” was untrue, both the CNT and the POUM’s 
newspapers were censored in the spring of 1937 and the beleaguered parties were unable 
to respond to the inflammatory accusations. These accusations began to turn the focus of 
the Republican groups away from their true enemy, Francisco Franco and the Nationalist 
Army. By persecuting “their own” ranks, it is as though the Communists and their allies 
were unwitting accomplices to the Spanish Army. Instead of directing their energy 
towards Franco, they were directing it amongst themselves. What would soon follow was 
a complete self-destruction and implosion of the Spanish Republic’s defenders. 
 Throughout March and April of 1937, concentrated attempts were made by the 
Communists and the Socialists to have the Anarchists and the POUM removed from the 
national and provincial governments throughout Spain.  
The next step taken by the government and the Communists, leading to the complete 
incorporation of Catalonia into the program of all Spain, proved to be too much for the 
POUM and the more virulent elements among the Anarchists to accept. Since the 
previous October they had watched their revolutionary accomplishments and control give 
way…The capitulation had reached its peak in April and May, 1937, and these groups 
felt that to give way another step would sacrifice the revolution for good. Even after a 
victory over Franco, they would have been too weak to reassert their control. (Payne, 
142) 
 
The Communists had been withholding aid from Catalonia due to the POUM’s 
participation within the Generalitat. It appears that the Communists set two conditions for 
the distribution of aid to Catalonia: that the POUM no longer be permitted to participate 
in the Generalitat and that the Catalonian government should follow the program planned 
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by the central government (Cattell, 109). In an effort to salvage any modicum of their 
power and influence, the revolutionary elements of the left began to fight back against the 
Communists and Socialists.  
 The Communists found other methods of frustrating the Anarchists. The CNT 
accused the Communists of denying them arms, ammunition, and other supplies. While it 
is true that the Republic did not possess an abundance of these necessities, George 
Orwell’s account seems to validate the CNT’s complaint that only militia units that were 
strictly under the PCE’s control were provided with supplies (Radosh, Habeck, and 
Sevastionav, 122). Orwell explains that the Communists deliberately withheld arms and 
supplies from the Anarchists for fear that the Anarchists would use the arms for a 
revolutionary end (68). The Soviets managed to control the distribution of supplies by 
having their own party members placed into key positions within the government. For 
example, Lieutenant-Colonel Antonio Cordón, the head of the technical secretariat of the 
ministry of war, controlled pay, supplies, and personnel (Beevor, 257). Considering the 
large numbers of syndicate members enlisted in the CNT, withholding arms from the 
Anarchists greatly reduced the number of men who could fight for the Republic. 
 May of 1937 was a month that most clearly demonstrates how the Communist 
policies helped lead the Republic towards destruction. David Cattell calls it the 
“culmination of the Communist purge of the revolutionary Left” (141). The PCE set out 
to ensure that all of its leftist opponents were either silenced or outlawed. The threat of 
the termination of Soviet aid helped the PCE in their quest to overtake their rivals.  When 
the revolutionary elements of the Spanish left realized that their existence was in danger, 
they began to fight back by assassinating Communist party members. In turn, the 
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Communists stepped up their attacks. May was a month of very violent infighting 
amongst the leftist groups in Barcelona, and the CNT/FAI and POUM were blamed by 
the PCE and PSUC for causing the problems. 
 The most famous of the May Week incidents was the battle over control of the 
Telefónica (Telephone Exchange) building in Barcelona. The CNT had taken control of 
the building at the very beginning of the war, and the Generalitat had been unable to 
recover it, giving the CNT control over phone communications throughout Catalonia. On 
May 3, the PSUC sent police to the Telefónica building to organize a voluntary hand-
over of the Telefónica building. The CNT refused the offer. “This was the spark igniting 
an outbreak of hostilities all over Barcelona, a city long used to rioting and open warfare. 
Each group brought out its hidden stores of arms, including machine guns and tanks, and 
set up barricades and gun emplacements to protect its particular section of the city” 
(Cattell, 142). By the evening of May 3, almost all of Barcelona was parceled into pieces 
controlled by the various workers’ groups.  
What the devil was happening, who was fighting whom, and who was winning, was at 
first very difficult to discover. The people of Barcelona are so used to street-fighting and 
so familiar with the local geography that they know by a kind of instinct which political 
party will hold which streets and which buildings…I could grasp that the Ramblas, which 
is one of the principal streets of the town, formed a dividing line. To the right of the 
Ramblas the working-class quarters were solidly Anarchist; to the left a confused fight 
was going on among the tortuous by-streets, but on that side the P.S.U.C. and the Civil 
Guards6 were more or less in control. Up at our end of the Ramblas, round the Plaza de 
Cataluña, the position was so complicated that it would have been quite unintelligible if 
every building had not flown a party flag. The principal landmark here was the Hotel 
Colón, the headquarters of the P.S.U.C., dominating the Plaza de Cataluña. In a window 
near the last O but one in the huge ‘Hotel Colón’ that sprawled across its face they had a 
machine-gun that could sweep the square with deadly effect. A hundred yards to the right 
of us, down the Ramblas, the J.S.U., the youth league of the P.S.U.C., were holding a big 
department store whose sand-bagged side-windows fronted our observatory. They had 
hauled down their red flag and hoisted the Catalan national flag. On the Telephone 
Exchange, the starting-point of all the trouble, the Catalan national flag and the Anarchist 
flag were flying side by side. Some kind of temporary compromise had been arrived at 
                                                 
6 It is known that Orwell erred in claiming that the “Civil Guards” were in control in the city because the 
Civil Guard was one of Franco’s military forces. Rather, the Assault Guards, who remained loyal to the 
Republic, are the group that he is describing.  
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there, the exchange was working uninterruptedly and there was no firing from the 
building. (Orwell, 131-2) 
 
Cattell adds that the only area controlled by the Generalitat was the land directly 
surrounding their governmental offices (142). George Orwell describes the situation of 
the following morning, May 4, from his post guarding the POUM’s barricade on the roof 
of the POUM Executive Building. Across the street, a group of Civil Guards were 
holding the Café Moka.  
One of the Civil Guards opposite knelt down and began firing across the barricade. I was 
on guard in the observatory at the time. I trained my rifle on him and shouted across: 
“Hi! Don’t you shoot at us!” 
“What?” 
“Don’t you fire at us or we’ll fire back!” 
“No, no! I wasn’t firing at you. Look – down there!” 
He motioned with his rifle towards the side-street that ran past the bottom of our building. 
Sure enough, a youth in blue overalls, with a rifle in his hand, was dodging round the 
corner. Evidently he had just taken a shot at the Civil Guards on the roof. 
“I was firing at him. He fired first.” (I believe this was true.) “We don’t want to shoot 
you. We’re only workers, the same as you are.” 
He made the anti-Fascist salute, which I returned. I shouted across: “Have you got any 
more beer left?” 
“No, it’s all gone.” (Orwell, 133) 
 
Much of Barcelona was not as friendly, however, and Orwell describes the constant 
sound of shots being fired from other areas of the city. The UGT and CNT leadership 
tried to forge a cease-fire and truce, and the city was back to some semblance of 
normality by May 9.  
 Although the weapons had been put down, the rifts between the leftist groups in 
Barcelona grew even deeper after accusations over responsibility for the week-long 
uprising began to fly. The Communists called the uprising a Fascist-provoked plot led by 
the POUM to end the Communist party’s domination in Catalonia. In his memoirs, PSUC 
Military Secretary Joaquin Almendros agrees, writing, “Pero también es cierto que fue el 
Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista el que ayudó a crear el clima propicio e insensato 
que condujo a los sucesos de mayo” (65). The CNT retorted that the whole situation had 
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been a plot contrived by the government, Communists, and the PSUC to eliminate the 
anarchist leadership from the Generalitat. Party accusations aside, the truth is that it was 
nothing more than an attempt by the PSUC (as mentioned, they were essentially the 
Communists of Catalonia) to wrest power within the province away from the Anarchists. 
The Republican government did little to dispel the idea of the Communists’ provocation 
of the uprising. “Caballero, leader of the left Socialists, sanctioned, if by nothing other 
than his silence, the actions carried out by his government against the Anarchists and 
urged by the Communist party” (Cattell, 147). As the most powerful syndicate in 
Catalonia, the CNT began to provide protection to POUM members, who were small in 
number and formed just about the only other revolutionary segment of the Spanish left. 
Consequently, rather than focusing on the fight between the Republicans and the 
Nationalists, Barcelona’s attention turned to the fight between the CNT/POUM and the 
remaining leftist groups. By mid-1937, the Nationalists had taken approximately 2/3 of 
the country, with only Madrid, Valencia, and Catalonia remaining in the hands of the 
Republic. Needless to say, the events of May occurred at a time when the Republic could 
least afford to be distracted from focusing on its main enemy, Francisco Franco, and the 
Nationalist army.  
 The POUM situation and the May Week events were two of the factors that led to 
the downfall of Largo Caballero. He had refused to outlaw the POUM’s existence despite 
pressure from the Communist party and several of his cabinet ministers. In fact, though 
Largo Caballero was unaware, several of his ministers had defected to the Communist 
Party (Bolloten, 114). Aggressive Communist propaganda painted him as the only 
remaining obstacle blocking the victory of the Republic and on April 14, the Comintern 
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sent a dispatch to the PCE to create a governmental crisis that would force Caballero out 
of his government position (Payne, 212-3). Caballero responded by trying to reduce the 
Communists’ influence in the government by restricting the power of the political 
commissars. Another point of issue between Caballero and the Communists was 
Caballero’s posts both as Prime Minister and as Minister of War. The Communists 
claimed that with both posts, Caballero could not dedicate enough time to strategy 
(Cattell, 155). Of course, it must also be noted that the Ministry of War was a post over 
which the Communists were desperate to gain control. The climax of the problem came 
as a result of Caballero’s planned offensive in the west to split the Nationalist army into 
two separate zones in May 1937. The Communists attempted to prevent the offensive by 
ordering General Miaja, the general in charge of executing the offensive, not to transfer 
the troops from Madrid. Nonetheless, Miaja gave in once Caballero directly ordered him 
to comply with the mandate. The Communists then precipitated a cabinet crisis when 
Hernández and Uribe walked out of government meetings. The Republicans and right 
Socialists also walked out on meetings over the next several days, putting the government 
on the verge of collapse. The Communists gave President Azaña and Largo Caballero an 
ultimatum: unless Largo Caballero resigned his post as Minister of War, the Soviet Union 
would cut off all arms supplies to Spain. As a result of the threat, Azaña would not allow 
Largo Caballero to keep the Minister of War position and Largo Caballero was forced to 
resign from both his posts on May 16, 1937.  
 The Communists had been calling for Largo Caballero’s expulsion from the 
government for quite some time and had been promoting Juan Negrín as their favored 
candidate. The following day (May 17), Negrín was named as the next Prime Minister 
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and he realized just how dire the Republic’s situation was. Opinions on the Negrín 
administration are mixed; some praise him as the leader who best symbolized the spirit of 
the Spanish Republic while others, such as Burnett Bolloten, vilify him as a great 
deceiver (Miralles, 25). Regardless of one’s personal opinions towards Negrín, the major 
defect of his governmental administration was the increasing amount of power that it 
granted to the Communists. Unfortunately for Negrín, he found himself in a catch-22 
situation. Without the aid of the Soviet Union, the Nationalists would easily be able to 
complete their takeover of the country. The Spanish Republic had no weapons and no 
ammunition with which to continue fighting. Because it had sent all its gold reserves to 
the Soviet Union, even if the European democracies had not cut off commerce with 
Spain, the Republic also had no money with which to purchase supplies from other 
countries. Although previous Republican administrations had created this dependency, 
Negrín knew that the Republic would live or die by the Communists. Furthermore, 
recognizing that the Communists could be just as influential in calling for Negrín’s 
removal as they had been in calling for his appointment as Prime Minister, Negrín knew 
he had to keep the Communists happy. As a result, Negrín chose to acquiesce to the 
demands and desires of the PCE and the PSUC.  
 Negrín’s government represented a complete change in the direction of the 
Republic. Since the beginning of the Civil War, there had been a power vacuum amongst 
the left in Spain, with all of the syndicates jockeying for position. This power struggle 
was a direct effect of the inability amongst the leftist groups to come to an agreement 
over the goals of the war. The Communists knew that Negrín’s administration would 
support their goal of postponing the workers’ revolution and that it would take power 
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back from the syndicates and put it in the hands of the political parties. Many felt that the 
Negrín administration was the true Popular Front government that they had been waiting 
for since the elections of 1936. Yet, “tal restauración se producía en medio del 
hundimiento del republicanismo, las divisiones del socialismo y el crecimiento insólito 
del PCE” (Miralles, 135). Negrín’s government did not attempt to create an equal 
division of power, as Largo Caballero had tried to maintain. Rather, he concentrated the 
power of the government in the hands of the Communists and the centrist-socialists, who 
had opposed the idea of revolution since the beginning. Negrin’s first cabinet consisted of 
three moderate Socialists (one being Negrín himself, who also served the role of finance 
minister), Hernández and Uribe, two Republicans, one Basque Nationalist, and one 
Catalonian Esquerra. The Communists had gotten their first wish: there were no left 
Socialists, no Anarchists, and no POUMists in Negrín’s cabinet. In other words, the 
government was comprised of anti-revolutionary leftist groups. The selection of Negrín 
as Prime Minister was highly praised by officials in London and in Washington. They 
commended Negrín’s “‘iron hand’” and “‘law-and-order’” stance. Meanwhile, his 
government turned a blind eye as the secret police persecuted anyone who opposed Stalin 
and as they annihilated the POUM in order to maintain the arms supplies from the Soviet 
Union (Beevor, 272). 
 Now that the Communists had succeeded in ousting the Anarchists from the 
government, they reached out to the CNT in an attempt to earn their cooperation with the 
government and its program. They indicated that if the CNT was willing to drop its 
revolutionary delusions and was willing to work towards the common goal of preventing 
the victory of fascism, then the Communists would lend them an audience (Cattell, 164). 
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Of course, the Anarchists were too angered at the recent occurrences in the government 
that they refused to cooperate. The Communists now faced a dilemma. They had desired 
to reduce the power of the Socialists and Left Socialists, but they had not meant to 
completely push away those groups. The cooperation of those parties was absolutely 
crucial to the success of the war. The PCE quickly realized that the damage they had 
inflicted on their relations with these groups was too great and found that their desire for 
unification was rapidly slipping away. 
 The Soviets had announced in December of 1936 that they would cut off all aid to 
Catalonia if the POUM was not thrown out of the Generalitat (the Catalonian 
governmental and administrative body). One of Negrín’s first actions as Prime Minister 
was to outlaw the POUM’s newspaper, La Batalla. Less than one month later, on June 
16, the POUM was declared illegal and POUM leaders were violently arrested 
throughout Barcelona.  
Meanwhile the police were arresting everyone they could lay hands on who was known 
to have any connection with the P.O.U.M. Within a day or two all or almost all of the 
forty members of the Executive Committee were in prison. Possibly one or two had 
escaped into hiding, but the police were adopting the trick of seizing a man’s wife as a 
hostage if he had disappeared. […] In some cases the police had even gone to the length 
of dragging wounded militiamen out of the hospitals. (Orwell, 205) 
 
A retroactive decree made a week later deemed these actions legal and also allowed for 
the formation of espionage and treason tribunals. During the trials, Largo Caballero 
testified in favor of the POUM and staunchly defended his refusal to outlaw a party that 
represented Spanish workers (Zavala, 27). Despite an international outcry over the unjust 
persecutions of the POUM, Negrín did nothing to thwart the outbreak of violence against 
the party.  
 Another event that created international outrage was the assassination and cover-
up of POUM leader Andreu Nin. Once the POUM was declared illegal, Nin was arrested 
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by Communist secret police. Interrogators tried to force him to confess to cooperating 
with the fascists, but he refused. In his last testimony, Nin wrote, “Niego una y mil veces 
que sea un espía fascista al servicio de Franco, como se me imputa” (qtd. in Zavala, 58). 
Frustrated by their inability to extract a confession from Nin, the secret police instead 
used a different method to “prove” his guilt.  
…false documents were prepared first to legalize Nin’s removal from the original jail and 
then to provide evidence that he had been liberated from the basement checa by foreign 
agents. German-speaking members of the International Brigades were used in the latter 
operation; they carefully left a wallet with German documentation as well as money from 
the Nationalist zone. On June 23 Nin was executed… (Payne, 228) 
 
The official Communist line was that Andreu Nin had been rescued by the Falange and 
was hiding somewhere in the Nationalist zone. Although no one believed the story, the 
Communists continued to propagate it even after Nin had already been executed.  It was 
not until after the war that official Communist documents ordering the execution were 
discovered. Though the execution took place during Negrín’s watch, he helped maintain 
the façade put forth by the Communists. “Preocupado por la imagen de la República en el 
exterior tras la desaparición de Nin, sostuvo ante la opinión pública la descabellada 
versión de que el jefe poumista había sido liberado de la cárcel por sus aliados de la 
Gestapo” (Zavala, 27).7   
 While Caballero had tried, at least to an extent, to keep a lid on the power of the 
Communists during his period as Prime Minister, Negrín did not follow the same 
philosophy. Rather, he continued giving the Communists more and more sway as the war 
continued. The purge of the revolutionary left turned out to be one of the nails in the 
coffin for the Republic. Despite the fact that the POUM was comprised of only several 
                                                 
7 Joaquín Maurín did not share the same unfortunate destiny as his friend. Rather, he was arrested in the 
Nationalist zone during the beginning of the war, and though he spent many years in prison, he was never 
executed. (Zavala, 15). 
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hundred members, the brutal persecution of that group commanded the attention of the 
entire left. Furthermore, the alienation of the left Socialists and the Anarchists greatly 
reduced the PCE’s allies. Though those groups continued to fight for the Republic until 
its last days, it was much more difficult to put together any sort of cooperative, organized 
campaign to face the quickly approaching Nationalist threat. There could no longer be 
any true People’s Army or United Front. The Communists and the centrists were now 
alone and could not do much more than watch as Franco continued to advance and the 
Spanish Army occupied more and more of what was previously territory held by the 
Republic. By this point, it was too late to save the Republic. The internal conflicts that 
the Communist parties had helped create had allowed Franco to advance deep into 
Republican territory and had destroyed the morale of the Republican militias. Catalonia 
was about to fall to the Nationalists and Negrín desperately began a futile attempt to 
negotiate a peace with Franco.  
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 The Soviet Union and the PCE played important roles in the development of the 
Spanish Civil War, both prior to the start of and during the war itself. The Communists 
made the same mistakes during the war that they made prior to it. Before the war began, 
the Communists promoted the idea of a Popular Front to stand against fascism, and they 
recruited other parties from the left to join in their endeavor. The PCE also made it clear 
that once the Popular Front was in place, it would pay no consideration to any previous 
alliances and would push forward with its own programs. This attitude alienated the 
moderate Republicans and it also showed the PCE’s self-importance. Though the PCE 
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proclaimed the importance of unity, its idea of unity was strict, unquestioning adherence 
by all to the Communist Party line. The same sort of actions are visible with the People’s 
Army and the United Front concepts that were developed after the outbreak of the war. 
While they preached an ideal of a unified Army and a single proletarian party that would 
defend the Republic at all costs, in reality, the policies and actions of the Communists 
created an atmosphere that had the opposite effect.  
 As they called for unification, the Communists also sought the elimination of all 
their opponents on the left, including the POUM and the Anarchists. They also pitted 
quarreling groups against each other as a method to gain increased control over the 
government and the left as a whole. The PCE realized this purge through the use of 
brutality and violence, as well as deception and mind games. Many of the Republican 
groups, such as the caballeristas and prietistas were wary of each other’s actions even 
before the war started. Rather than employing methods to attempt to reconcile the 
differences between these groups, the PCE fed the paranoia and disdain that each group 
held for the other, effectively deepening the chasms that existed between the various 
parties. These purges of the dissident Spanish left, combined with the control and 
influence the Communists held over the Republican government, destroyed any chance 
that a true unity could exist among the various leftist groups. The policies and actions of 
the PCE completely undermined their stated goals and hopes for the Spanish Republic 
and its allies. Diego Abad de Santillán describes the involvement of the Soviet Union and 
the participation of the Communists as such: 
La intervención rusa, que no solucionó ningún problema vital desde el punto de vista del 
material, escaso, de pésima calidad, arbitrariamente distribuido, dando preferencia 
irritante a sus secuaces, corrompió a la burocracia republicana, comenzando por los 
hombres del gobierno, asumió la dirección del ejército, y desmoralizó de tal modo al 
pueblo que éste perdió poco a poco todo interés en la guerra, en una guerra que se había 
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iniciado por decisión incontrovertible de la única soberanía legítima: la soberanía 
popular. (15) 
 
Though the Soviet Union and the PCE sought to portray themselves as defenders and 
friends of the Spanish Republic, the politics they pursued throughout the Spanish conflict 
created a “civil war” amongst the left, which ultimately aided the Nationalists to victory 
in the Civil War.  
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